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Abstract
Mathematicians, physicists, and philosophers of physics often look to
the symmetries of an object for insight into the structure or constitution
of the object. My aim in this paper is to explain why this practice is
successful. In order to do so, I prove two theorems that are closely related
to (and in a sense, generalizations of) Beth’s and Svenonius’ theorems.
1 Introduction
There is a famous idea about the relationship between the symmetries, or au-
tomorphisms, of a mathematical object and the structure of the object: An
object’s symmetries are often taken to provide us with significant information
about its underlying structure. Hermann Weyl (1952, 144–5), for example, puts
this idea as follows.
A guiding principle in modern mathematics is this lesson: Whenever
you have to do with a structure-endowed entity X, try to determine
its group of automorphisms, the group of those element-wise trans-
formations which leave all structural relations undisturbed. You can
expect to gain a deep insight into the constitution of X in this way.
Mathematicians, physicists, and philosophers of physics often employ Weyl’s
guiding principle. But justification for it is rarely offered,1 and one is therefore
left to wonder exactly why the automorphisms of X provide us with insight into
the constitution of X. The aim of this paper is to answer this question.
We will begin by isolating a precise sense in which the automorphisms of an
object encode significant information about the object. They provide a method
of determining which structures are “definable” in terms of the basic structure
of the object. Although there is a sense in which this method is imperfect, it
∗I can be reached at thomaswbarrett@nyu.edu. Thanks to Neil Dewar, John Dougherty,
Ben Feintzeig, Hans Halvorson, Phillip Kremer, Alex Meehan, and Jim Weatherall for com-
ments and discussion on earlier versions of this paper.
1A notable exception is Dasgupta (2016). He understands symmetries in epistemic terms,
rather than in “formal and mathematical” terms. He argues that the latter understanding of
symmetries does not allow one to justify all of the inferences that are commonly made about
symmetries. The discussion here can be understood as an exploration of how far we can get
while still thinking about symmetries in the standard formal and mathematical terms.
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suggests a more general way to learn about the structure of an object: Rather
than only looking to automorphisms, one can use all of the structure-preserving
maps between mathematical objects as a guide to the structure of the objects.
We isolate a precise sense in which this more general method provides an even
better guide to the structure of a mathematical object. One certainly can expect
to gain a deep insight into the constitution of X by looking to X’s automorphism
group, but one can gain a deeper insight by looking to all of the structure-
preserving maps between objects of the same type as X.
2 Symmetries and structure
Philosophers of physics often trace the standard method of reasoning about sym-
metries and structure back to the correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke on
the nature of spacetime, and in particular, Leibniz’s boost and shift arguments
against Newtonian absolute space.2 In their modern gloss, Leibniz’s arguments
aim to show that particular pieces of structure that Newton is committed to —
namely, absolute position and absolute velocity — are not invariant under the
symmetries of spacetime. Leibniz concludes from this that spacetime does not
actually come equipped with those structure. Mathematicians, physicists, and
philosophers of physics now reason about symmetries and structure in an anal-
ogous manner: After determining the symmetries of a particular mathematical
object X, one will look for the structures on X that are “invariant under” or
“preserved by” all of the symmetries of X. Those structures that are found to
be invariant under the symmetries of X are often deemed to be “determined
by” or “constructed from” or “come for free given” the basic structure of X.
On the other hand, those structures that are found to be not invariant under
the symmetries of X are not accorded this same status.
One can grasp the basic idea behind this method by considering the following
examples. The first three are examples of structures that are invariant under
the symmetries of the underlying mathematical object, and the latter three are
examples of structures that are not.
Example 1. The norm is invariant under the symmetries of an inner product
space. Let (V, 〈·, ·〉) be an inner product space, and consider the norm || · || on
V associated with the inner product. Every automorphism f of (V, 〈·, ·〉) also
preserves the norm, in the sense that ||v|| = ||fv|| for all v ∈ V . y
Example 2. The metric topology is invariant under the symmetries of a metric
space. Let (X, d) be a metric space, and consider the metric topology τd on X.
Every automorphism of (X, d) preserves the topology τd, in the sense that it is
a homeomorphism. y
Example 3. The Levi-Civita derivative operator is invariant under the symme-
tries of a manifold with metric. Let (M, gab) be a smooth manifold with metric,
2For discussion see Earman (1989), Baker (2010), Dasgupta (2015, 2016), and the references
therein.
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and consider the Levi-Civita derivative operator ∇ associated with gab. Every
automorphism of (M, gab) preserves the derivative operator ∇, in the sense that
f∗(∇nλa1...arb1...bs ) = ∇nf∗(λa1...arb1...bs ) for all smooth tensor fields λa1...arb1...bs . y
Example 4. An order is not invariant under the symmetries of a set. Let X be
a set containing more than one element, and consider an arbitrary linear order
< on X. There is an automorphism of X (i.e. a bijection X → X) that does
not preserve <. y
Example 5. An inner product is not invariant under the symmetries of a vector
space. Let V be a vector space, and consider an arbitrary inner product 〈·, ·〉
on V . One can easily show that there is an automorphism of V that does not
preserve the inner product. y
Example 6. The Galilean temporal metric is not invariant under the sym-
metries of Minkowski spacetime. Let (R4, ηab) be Minkowski spacetime, and
consider the standard temporal metric tab = (dax
1)(dbx
1) of Galilean space-
time. There are automorphisms of (R4, ηab) that do not preserve tab (Barrett,
2015b, Proposition 2). y
There is a stark contrast between the first three examples and the latter
three. The norm || · ||, the metric topology τd, and the Levi-Civita derivative
operator ∇ are all determined by the basic structure of their respective mathe-
matical objects. In fact, in each of the first three examples the basic structure
of the mathematical object suffices to define the piece of invariant structure.
In Example 1, for instance, one uses the inner product in the familiar way to
define the norm ||v|| :=√〈v, v〉 of a vector v ∈ V . The same holds of the metric
topology and the Levi-Civita derivative operator. They are definable in terms
of the metric d and the metric gab, respectively.
The structures on a mathematical object that are not invariant under the
symmetries of the object, on the other hand, are not “determined by” the basic
structure of the underlying mathematical object. In contrast to the invariant
structures from Examples 1–3, the basic structure of the mathematical objects
in Examples 4–6 does not suffice to define the new piece of structure. A set does
not define a privileged ordering of its elements, the basic structure of a vector
space does not suffice to define a privileged inner product, and the Minkowski
metric famously does not define a notion of absolute simultaneity on spacetime.
Examples like the above six suggest the following “conjecture” about the
relationship between symmetry and structure:
Conjecture. A piece of structure is invariant under the symmetries of a math-
ematical object if and only if it is definable from the basic structure of the object.
If true, this conjecture would explain why Weyl’s guiding principle is success-
ful. It is natural to think of mathematical objects as coming equipped not only
with their “basic structure,” but also with the structures that are definable in
terms of their basic structure. If the symmetries of an object tell us which struc-
tures on the object are definable in terms of the object’s basic structure, then
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they provide us with a guide to the structures that the object actually comes
equipped with. Symmetries would then provide us with insight into a mathe-
matical object’s constitution because they tell us precisely which structures the
object has and which the object lacks.
3 Two theorems
In order to consider whether this conjecture is true, we first need to clarify it. We
do so by working in the framework of standard first-order logic, and in particular,
the theory of definability. We will need the following basic preliminaries.3
A signature Σ is a set of predicate symbols, function symbols, and constant
symbols. The Σ-terms, Σ-formulas, and Σ-sentences are recursively defined in
the standard way. A Σ-structure A is a nonempty set in which the symbols of
Σ have been interpreted. One recursively defines when a sequence of elements
a1, . . . , an ∈ A satisfy a Σ-formula φ(x1, . . . , xn) in a Σ-structure A, written
A  φ[a1, . . . , an]. We will use the notation φA to denote the set of tuples from
the Σ-structure A that satisfy a Σ-formula φ. A Σ-sentence is a Σ-formula
with no free variables. So if φ is a Σ-sentence, then A  φ just in case the empty
sequence satisfies φ in A. A Σ-theory T is a set of Σ-sentences. The sentences
φ ∈ T are called the axioms of T . A Σ-structure M is a model of a Σ-theory
T if M  φ for all φ ∈ T . Two Σ-theories are logically equivalent if they
have the same class of models. A theory T entails a sentence φ, written T  φ,
if M  φ for every model M of T . If Σ ⊂ Σ+ are signatures, we say that a
Σ+-theory T+ is an extension of a Σ-theory T if T  φ implies that T+  φ
for every Σ-sentence φ.
We can now clarify what it might mean for the basic structure of a mathe-
matical object to “define” an additional piece of structure. The standard way
to do this employs the following set-up.
• Let Σ be a signature. We think of the elements of Σ as the pieces of “basic
structure” of the mathematical objects under consideration.
• Let r be a symbol that is not contained in Σ. We think of r as the
additional piece of structure that we are investigating. It may or may not
be invariant under the symmetries of the mathematical object. We will
assume for simplicity that r is a unary predicate symbol, but everything
that follows easily generalizes to the cases where r is not unary and where
r is a function or constant symbol.
• Let T be a Σ ∪ {r}-theory. We think of the theory T as picking out the
“type of mathematical object” that we will be considering.
It is worth taking a moment here to state how this set-up relates to some of the
above examples. In Example 3 “the language of manifolds with metric” plays
the role of Σ, the derivative operator ∇ plays the role of r, and “the theory of
3The reader is encouraged to consult Hodges (2008) for further details.
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manifolds with metric and Levi-Civita derivative operator” plays the role of T .
Similarly, in Example 5 “the language of vector spaces” plays the role of Σ, the
inner product 〈·, ·〉 plays the role of r, and “the theory of inner product spaces”
plays the role of T .
There are two particularly natural ways of making precise the idea that the
theory T defines the structure r in terms of the basic structures in Σ. The first
condition that we will consider is the following.
(E1) There is a Σ-formula φ such that T  ∀x(r(x)↔ φ(x)).
When E1 holds, we say that the theory T explicitly defines r in terms of Σ.
We call the sentence ∀x(r(x) ↔ φ(x)) an explicit definition of r in terms of
Σ. The condition E1 captures a sense in which r can be “constructed from” the
basic structures in Σ.
The following condition provides us with a second natural way to explicate
the idea that T defines r in terms of the basic structures in Σ.
(I1) For all models M and N of T , if M |Σ = N |Σ, then rM = rN .
Here M |Σ and N |Σ are the Σ-structures obtained from M and N by “forgetting”
the extension of the predicate r. When I1 holds, we say that T implicitly
defines r in terms of Σ. Like E1, this captures a sense in which r is “determined
by” the basic structures in Σ. The condition simply says that whenever two
models agree on the structures in Σ, they must also agree on the structure r.
These basic intuitions behind explicit and implicit definition are confirmed
by the following example.
Example 7. Let Σ = {p, q} be a signature containing two unary predicate
symbols, and consider the Σ-theory T with the following two axioms.
∀x(p(x) ∨ q(x)) ∀x¬(p(x) ∧ q(x))
This theory says that there are two types of things — the p’s and the q’s
— and everything is of one of these types, but not both. One verifies that
T  ∀x(p(x) ↔ ¬q(x)), which means that T explicitly defines p in terms of q.
The predicate p can intuitively be “constructed” by taking the negation of the
predicate q. One also shows that any two models M and N of T with qM = qN
must also satisfy pM = pN , which means that T implicitly defines p in terms
of q. The extension of the predicate q “determines” the predicate p. (One can
easily see that T also explicitly and implicitly defines q in terms of p.) y
This example suggests that explicit definability and implicit definability are
intimately related to one another. The following famous result establishes that
this is indeed the case.
Beth’s theorem. E1 if and only if I1.
Proof. See Hodges (2008, Theorem 6.6.4).
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With Beth’s theorem in hand, we have the resources to address our con-
jecture from above. We would like to know what the relationship is between
the definability conditions E1 and I1 and the invariance (or lack thereof) of the
structure r under symmetries. The following condition is a natural way to make
precise the idea that r is invariant under symmetries of the basic structures in
Σ.
(S1) For any model M of T , if h : M |Σ → M |Σ is an automorphism, then
h[rM ] = rM .
An automorphism of a Σ-structure A is a bijection from A to itself that
preserves the extensions of all of the predicates, functions, and constants in Σ.
Automorphisms of a Σ-structure N are the maps from N to itself that preserve
all of the basic structures in Σ. The condition S1 is therefore a straightforward
way of saying that the symmetries of the basic structures of M preserve the
structure r too.
We have the following simple result about the relationship between the con-
ditions E1 and S1.
Proposition. If E1, then S1.
Proof. Let φ be the Σ-formula (whose existence is guaranteed by E1) that ex-
plicitly defines r, and let h : M |Σ →M |Σ be an automorphism. Since automor-
phisms preserve the extensions of all Σ-formulas, h[φM ] = φM . E1 guarantees
that φM = rM , which immediately implies S1.
In conjunction with Beth’s theorem, this result shows that I1 also implies
S1. The most natural way to use this proposition is by appealing to its contra-
positive. The contrapositive provides us with a simple way of showing that a
piece of structure is not definable: If we can show that a piece of structure is not
invariant under the symmetries of a mathematical object, then this proposition
licenses us to conclude that the structure is not definable (neither explicitly nor
implicitly) from the basic structures of the mathematical object.4
One can see this method in action by looking back to Examples 4–6. In
Example 5, for instance, one shows that there is an automorphism of a vector
space V that does not preserve the inner product. The contrapositive of this
proposition (extrapolating beyond first-order logic) licenses one to conclude that
an inner product is not defined by the basic structure of a vector space. There
is no natural inner product that is “determined by” or “comes for free given”
the basic structure of a vector space.
The proposition gives us the “if” half of our conjecture. If a piece of structure
is definable from the basic structure of a mathematical object, then it is invariant
under the symmetries of the object. But the proposition leaves open the “only
if” half of the conjecture. We still do not know the extent to which we are
4In this respect the proposition is closely related to the “only if” half of Beth’s theorem,
which is sometimes called “Padoa’s method.”
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justified in concluding that the pieces of invariant structure in Examples 1–3
are definable in terms of the basic structure of the underlying objects.
Unfortunately, the following example shows that this inference is not yet
justified: S1 does not imply E1.
Example 8. Consider the signature Σ = {p}, where p is a unary predicate
symbol, and let T be the Σ ∪ {r}-theory with the one axiom ∃=1x(x = x).
This theory says that there is one thing, but says nothing about whether it is
p or r. The condition S1 holds of the theory T . Indeed, if M is a model of
T and h : M |{p} → M |{p} is an automorphism, then it must be that h is the
identity map, since M only contains one element. This immediately implies
that h[rM ] = rM . But I1 does not hold of T since there are models M and N
with pM = pN but rM 6= rN . Beth’s theorem implies that E1 also fails to hold
of T . y
This example demonstrates a sense in which the “only if” half of the con-
jecture fails. Indeed, it seems that the symmetries of a mathematical object do
not provide us with a complete guide to the definable structures of the object.
A piece of structure’s invariance under the automorphisms of an object does not
necessarily imply that it is definable from the object’s basic structure.
There is, however, a way to substantiate the conjecture: We can be more
restrictive about what kinds of mathematical objects we are considering. We
say that a Σ-theory T is complete if for every Σ-sentence φ, either T  φ or
T  ¬φ. When one restricts attention to complete theories, the converse of the
above proposition holds.
Svenonius’ theorem. If T is complete, then E1 if and only if S1.
Proof. See Hodges (2008, Corollary 10.5.2).
Svenonius’ theorem shows that our conjecture holds for complete theories.
For this restricted class of mathematical objects — that is, models of complete
theories — it is the case that a piece of structure is definable if and only if it is
invariant under symmetry. But this way of substantiating the conjecture leaves
something to be desired. Completeness is a strong condition to impose on a
theory. Most first-order theories are not complete, and one wonders what the
relationship is between symmetry and structure for these more general theories.
Fortunately, there is another way to try to overcome the fact that S1 does not
imply E1. So far, when asking what symmetries tell us about structure, we have
only allowed ourselves to consider the automorphisms of a mathematical object.
But automorphisms are just one particular kind of structure-preserving map
between mathematical objects — namely, the ones from an object to itself. This
observation suggests a more general way to learn about the definable structures
on a mathematical object X: Rather than only looking to the automorphisms
of X, one can look to all of the structure-preserving maps between objects of
the same kind as X. It is natural to wonder how much information this larger
class of maps encodes about the definable structures on X.
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The following two generalizations of the condition S1 are in line with this
new approach.
(S2) For all models M and N of T , if h : M |Σ → N |Σ is an elementary embed-
ding, then h[rM ] = rN .
(S3) For all models M and N of T , if h : M |Σ → N |Σ is an isomorphism, then
h[rM ] = rN .
Two clarifications are in order about these conditions. First, an elementary
embedding between Σ-structures A and B is a map h : A→ B that satisfies
A  φ[a1, . . . , an] if and only if B  φ[h(a1), . . . , h(an)]
for all Σ-formulas φ(x1, . . . , xn) and elements a1, . . . , an ∈ A. And second, an
isomorphism h : A → B between the Σ-structures A and B is a bijection
that preserves the extensions of all predicates, functions, and constant symbols
in Σ. Every automorphism is an isomorphism, and every isomorphism is an
elementary embedding, but in general the converses do not hold.
The conditions S2 and S3 differ from S1 only in that they appeal to elemen-
tary embeddings and isomorphisms instead of automorphisms. These conditions
provide two straightforward ways of saying that maps between models of T that
preserve their basic structure also preserve the structure r. It turns out that S2
and S3 are both equivalent to E1 and I1. By themselves, the automorphisms
of a mathematical object did not provide us with all of the information about
the definable structure on that object. But once we allow ourselves to look at
these larger classes of maps — that is, elementary embeddings or isomorphisms
— we are provided with all of the information about definable structure.
Theorem 1. E1 if and only if S2.
Proof. Suppose first that E1 holds. Let M and N be models of T with h :
M |Σ → N |Σ an elementary embedding. We immediately see that
h[rM ] = h[φM ] = φN = rN
where φ is the Σ-formula (whose existence is guaranteed by E1) that explicitly
defines r. The first and third equalities follow from E1, while the second equality
holds since h is an elementary embedding. This implies S2.
Now suppose that S2 holds. Let M and N be models of T with M |Σ = N |Σ.
The identity map 1 : M |Σ → N |Σ is an elementary embedding, so by S2 it must
be that 1[rM ] = rN . This immediately implies that rM = rN and so M = N .
We have therefore shown I1. Beth’s theorem then implies E1.
Theorem 2. E1 if and only if S3.
Proof. Suppose that E1 holds. Theorem 1 implies that S2 must hold, and since
every isomorphism is an elementary embedding we immediately see that S3
holds too. On the other hand, if S3 holds, one establishes E1 by arguing exactly
as in the “if” half of Theorem 1.
8
4 Philosophical payoffs
The relationships between these different notions of definability and invariance




Beth’s theorem establishes the left-most equivalence in the top row, while the
other two follow from Theorems 1 and 2. The relationship between S1 and the
conditions in the top row follows from our proposition and Example 8.
These results come to bear on our earlier conjecture (which we restate here
for convenience) in a straightforward manner.
Conjecture. A piece of structure is invariant under the symmetries of a math-
ematical object if and only if it is definable from the basic structure of the object.
The fact that S1 does not entail the conditions E1 and I1 shows that auto-
morphisms by themselves do not encode all of the information about definable
structure. So there is a sense in which the “only if” half of the conjecture
does not hold. But the equivalence of S2 and S3 with E1 and I1 does estab-
lish a slightly weaker form of the conjecture. These equivalences show that the
class of all structure-preserving maps between mathematical objects encodes all
of the information about which structures are and are not definable on the ob-
jects. These results therefore suggest an amendment to Weyl’s guiding principle
about symmetry and structure: One can gain insight into the constitution of a
mathematical object by looking to the class of structure-preserving maps between
objects of the same kind.
In addition to allowing us to improve upon Weyl’s guiding principle, these
results help to justify a number of arguments in philosophy of physics and the
foundations of mathematics. It is common practice in philosophy of physics
to use the symmetries of a particular physical theory as a means of examining
the structure of the theory. For example, symmetries are often used in debates
between substantivalists and relationalists about the structure of spacetime. Re-
lationalists will often argue that a particular piece of structure — like “absolute
position” or “absolute velocity” — is not invariant under the symmetries of
spacetime. This type of argument can be understood as an appeal to the “if”
half of our conjecture. If one can show that a piece of structure is not invariant
under the symmetries of spacetime, then one is licensed to conclude that the
structure is not definable in terms of the basic structure of spacetime. This in
turn provides a strong sense in which spacetime simply does not come equipped
with that structure.5
5For discussion of spacetime symmetries, see Earman (1989), Dasgupta (2015, 2016), and
the references therein. Weatherall (2017b) contains an argument about when the “extra
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The “only if” half of the conjecture is sometimes employed more explicitly.
One particularly famous example appears in the literature on the conventionality
of simultaneity in special relativity. Philosophers of physics believed for many
years that special relativity did not come equipped with a privileged notion of
observer-relative simultaneity; the standard special relativistic notion of simul-
taneity was instead thought to be merely a convention. Malament (1977) was
able to show, however, that the standard simultaneity relation on Minkowski
spacetime is the only non-trivial equivalence relation that is invariant under the
symmetries of special relativity. Malament explicitly appeals to the “only if”
half of our conjecture to explain why his result is so powerful: It implies that the
standard simultaneity relation is the only non-trivial equivalence relation that
is definable in terms of the basic structure of Minkowski spacetime. In other
words, Minkowski spacetime does not come equipped with any other candidate
for a simultaneity relation.
The conjecture also comes to bear on two broader issues in philosophy of
physics: the question of how to compare structure between theories and the
question of how to assess whether or not two theories are equivalent. We con-
clude by discussing these two topics in turn.
Structure
The history of classical spacetime theories is often viewed as a progression
towards a “less structured” spacetime. Aristotelian spacetime posits more
structure than Newtonian spacetime, which in turn posits more structure than
Galilean spacetime.6 Intuitively, each of these spacetimes is obtained by tak-
ing something away from its predecessor. Galilean spacetime, for example, is
obtained by taking away the preferred rest frame from Newtonian spacetime.
In order to capture the relationship that these different spacetime theories
bear to one another, one needs a precise method of comparing “amounts of
structure.” Such a method would also be useful when diagnosing whether the
models of a particular physical theory have “surplus structure” or when a theory
is a “gauge theory.”7 It has recently been suggested that symmetries can be
used to compare amounts of structure between mathematical objects. The basic
idea behind this suggestion is that since the automorphisms of an object are the
invertible structure-preserving maps from the object to itself, an object with
“more automorphisms” must have “less structure” that these automorphisms
are required to preserve.8 The amount of structure that an object has is (in
some sense) inversely proportional to the size of the object’s automorphism
facts” that the substantivalist demands are definable in a particular mathematical structure,
connecting the issues discussed in this paper to some of the classic works on substantivalism,
relationalism, and symmetry. For general discussion of symmetries in philosophy of physics,
see Belot (2003, 2013), Brading and Castellani (2007), Baker (2010), and Dewar (2015).
6See Maudlin (2012), Geroch (1978), and Barrett (2015b) for discussion.
7Weatherall (2016b) discusses the relationship between these two notions.
8For discussion of symmetries, automorphisms, and amounts of structure see Earman
(1989), Ismael and van Fraassen (2003), North (2009), Halvorson (2011), Swanson and Halvor-
son (2012), Curiel (2014), Barrett (2015b,a), Weatherall (2016b), and Dewar (2016).
10
group. The following criterion has been proposed by Swanson and Halvorson
(2012) and Barrett (2015a,b) to make this idea precise.
SYM∗: X has more structure than Y if the automorphism group of X is a
proper subset of the automorphism group of Y .
Our results about definability and invariance under symmetry lend support
to this kind of criterion. If an object has “more automorphisms,” then it is more
difficult for a new piece of structure to be invariant under these automorphisms.
The size of an object’s automorphism group therefore provides us with a guide
to the amount of definable structure that the object has. And indeed, SYM∗
makes the intuitive verdicts when presented with many classic examples. A
topological space has more structure than a bare set, an inner product space
has more structure than a bare vector space, and a manifold with metric has
more structure than a bare manifold. In addition, SYM∗ makes the correct
verdicts when applied to classical spacetime theories (Barrett, 2015b).
The problem with SYM∗, however, stems from the fact that S1 does not
entail E1. The automorphisms of an object do not provide a complete guide
to definable structures on that object. This worry can be made precise by
considering again the situation from Example 8. One can easily verify that
for every model M of T , it is not the case that the structure M |{p} has less
structure than M according to SYM∗. Indeed, the two objects have precisely
the same automorphism group. This is an undesirable verdict. The object M
comes equipped with the structure provided by predicate r, and this is structure
that the object M |{p} does not have. The fact that E1 does not hold of T shows
that r is not even definable in terms of the structure on M |{p}. Intuitively, M
therefore has more structure than M |{p}. The criterion SYM∗ makes the wrong
verdict in this case.
The results above suggest that we can obtain a better guide to the amount
of structure that an object has by looking to the class of all structure-preserving
maps between objects rather than merely the automorphisms. And in fact, a
method of comparing amounts of structure that employs exactly this idea has
already been proposed. Baez et al. (2006) have suggested that one can compare
amounts of structure between mathematical objects by looking to the categories
in which the objects reside.9
In order to explain this method of comparing amounts of structure, we need
the following simple category-theoretic machinery.10 A first-order theory T has
a category of models. A category C is a collection of objects with arrows
between the objects that satisfy some basic properties. We will use the notation
Mod(T ) to denote the category of models of T . An object in Mod(T ) is a
model M of T , and an arrow f : M → N between objects in Mod(T ) is an
elementary embedding f : M → N between the models M and N . A functor
F : C → D between categories C and D is a structure-preserving map between
9See also Barrett and Halvorson (2013) and Weatherall (2016b).
10The reader is encouraged to consult Mac Lane (1971) or Borceux (1994) for further details.
We take for granted the definitions of a category and of a functor.
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categories. When T+ is an extension of a Σ-theory T , we can define the functor
Π : Mod(T+)→ Mod(T ) by
Π(M) = M |Σ Π(h) = h
for every model M of T+ and elementary embedding h between models of T+.
One can easily verify that Π is a functor. We say that a functor F : C → D is
full if for all objects c1, c2 in C and arrows g : Fc1 → Fc2 in D there exists an
arrow f : c1 → c2 in C with Ff = g. F is faithful if for all objects c1, c2 in C
and arrows f, g : c1 → c2, Ff = Fg implies that f = g. And F is essentially
surjective if for every object d in D there is an object c in C such that Fc
is isomorphic to d. A functor that is full, faithful, and essentially surjective is
called an equivalence of categories.
Baez et al. (2006) classify functors between categories based on “what they
forget.” Most importantly for our purposes, when a functor F : C → D is not
full it is said to forget structure. The existence of a functor F : C → D that
forgets structure captures a sense in which (relative to the comparison generated
by F ) objects of D have less structure than objects of C. One can see the idea
behind this method by considering the following example. It is standard to
recognize a sense in which topological spaces have more structure than sets,
and the Baez method of comparing amounts of structure allows one to recover
this sense.
Example 9. Consider the categories Set and Top. The objects of Set are sets
and the arrows are functions between sets. The objects of Top are topological
spaces and the arrows are continuous functions. One particularly natural functor
U : Top→ Set is defined by
U : (X, τ) 7−→ X U : f 7−→ f
for all topological spaces (X, τ) and continuous functions f . One can easily verify
that U is a functor. It converts a topological space into a set by “forgetting”
about the topology. Since there are functions between some topological spaces
that are not continuous, U trivially is not full and therefore forgets structure. y
The motivation behind the Baez method of comparing amounts of struc-
ture is the same as that behind SYM∗. Since the functor U : Top → Set is
not full, this provides a sense in which there are “more arrows” (relative to
the comparison given by U) between objects in the category Set than there
are between objects in the category Top. The arrows in these categories are
structure-preserving maps between the objects. Therefore, since there are “more
structure-preserving maps” between the objects of Set than there are between
the objects of Top, the former must have less structure that these maps are
required to preserve.
Theorem 1 yields a corollary that concretely justifies the Baez method of
comparing amounts of structure.
Corollary 1. Let T+ be a Σ ∪ {r}-theory that is an extension of the Σ-theory
T . The functor Π : Mod(T+)→ Mod(T ) forgets structure if and only if E1 does
not hold of T+.
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Proof. It is easy to verify that Π is full if and only if S2 holds of T+. Theorem
1 then immediately implies the corollary.
Extrapolating beyond the case of first-order theories, this corollary tells us
that a functor from C to D forgets structure if and only if the objects in C have
structure that is not definable from the structure of the objects in D. Note that
this feature of the Baez method is an improvement upon the criterion SYM∗.
As we saw when we revisited Example 8, it can be the case that objects of C
and D have the same amount of structure according to SYM∗, even though
the objects of C come equipped with some structure that is not definable in
terms of the structure that objects of D have. The automorphism group of a
mathematical object therefore does not provide us with a perfect guide to the
amount of definable structure than an object has. Corollary 1, however, shows
that the category in which the object resides does provide us with such a guide.
Equivalence
These results also come to bear on a particular approach to theoretical equiva-
lence, a topic which has recently received significant attention from philosophers
of science.11 We would like to know the conditions under which two theories
should be considered equivalent. It has recently been suggested that category
theory provides us with a standard for equivalence of theories: Two theories
T1 and T2 are categorically equivalent if their categories of models Mod(T1)
and Mod(T2) are “structurally identical”, i.e. if there is a functor F between
them that is an equivalence of categories. This criterion is supposed to capture
a sense in which the two theories might be considered “intertranslatable.”
One would therefore hope that categorically equivalent theories T1 and T2
are such that the structures of T1 are definable in terms of T2 and vice versa.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. Barrett and Halvorson (2016b, Theorem 5.2)
provide an example of theories T1 and T2 that are categorically equivalent, but
T1 is unable to define the structures of T2 and vice versa. This demonstrates
the following:
It is not the case that an equivalence of categories between Mod(T1)
and Mod(T2) implies that the structures of T1 are definable in terms
of the structures of T2.
This result is a definite mark against categorical equivalence as a general stan-
dard for equivalence of theories. Our discussion here, however, does suggest
that one might be able to strengthen categorical equivalence in a way that does
11For example, see Quine (1975), Sklar (1982), Halvorson (2012, 2013, 2016), Glymour
(2013), Van Fraassen (2014), and Coffey (2014) for general discussion of theoretical equivalence
in philosophy of science. Glymour (1977), Knox (2014), Weatherall (2016a, 2017a), North
(2009), Swanson and Halvorson (2012), Curiel (2014), Barrett (2015a, 2016), Rosenstock
et al. (2015), Rosenstock and Weatherall (2016), Rosenstock (2015), Hudetz (2015) discuss
particular physical theories. For various logical results proven about criteria for equivalence
see Barrett and Halvorson (2016b) and the references therein.
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allows it to better capture facts about definability. In particular, we have an-
other simple corollary. In order to state this corollary we need one definition.
Let Σ ⊂ Σ+ be signatures. A definitional extension of a Σ-theory S to the
signature Σ+ is a Σ+-theory that is logically equivalent to the theory
S+ = S ∪ {δs : s ∈ Σ+ − Σ},
where for each symbol s ∈ Σ+ − Σ, the sentence δs is an explicit definition of
s in terms of Σ. Two theories are definitionally equivalent if they have a
common definitional extension.12
Corollary 2. Let T+ be a Σ ∪ {r}-theory that is an extension of the Σ-theory
T . The functor Π : Mod(T+) → Mod(T ) is an equivalence if and only if T+ is
a definitional extension of T .13
Proof. The proof of the “if” half is familiar; it follows from Theorem 5.1 of
Barrett and Halvorson (2016b). Assume then that Π is an equivalence. Since
Π is full, Corollary 1 implies that E1 holds of T+, so
T+  ∀x(φ(x)↔ r(x))
for some Σ-formula φ. Now using the fact that Π is essentially surjective, one
easily verifies that T ∪ {∀x(φ(x)↔ r(x))} is logically equivalent to T+.
The existence of an arbitrary equivalence between the categories of models
of two theories does not guarantee that the two theories can define one another’s
structures. But if Π is an equivalence, then Corollary 2 implies that the two
theories can do precisely this. It is natural to wonder whether there is some
special propertyP of the functor Π that allows it to encode more about definable
structure than an arbitrary functor does. This suggests a family of conjectures
of the following form:
If there is a functor F that (i) is an equivalence of categories between
Mod(T1) and Mod(T2) and (ii) has property P, then T1 and T2 are
definitionally equivalent.14
12Definitional extensions and definitional equivalence have received attention in logic and
philosophy of science. For example, see de Bouve´re (1965), Kanger (1968), Glymour (1971,
1977, 1980, 2013), Pinter (1978), Pelletier and Urquhart (2003), Andre´ka et al. (2005), Fried-
man and Visser (2014), and Barrett and Halvorson (2016a,b, 2017a,b), and the references
therein.
13It is important to mention a subtlety about the statement of this corollary. Note that since
we are working in the framework of single-sorted logic, the functor Π is always guaranteed
to be faithful. In the many-sorted framework, Π can fail to be faithful, and therefore, this
corollary fails in this more general framework. I conjecture that the following result holds
universally: Π is an equivalence if and only if T+ is a Morita extension of T , in the sense
defined by Barrett and Halvorson (2016b).
14As in footnote 13, the more general conjecture replaces definitional equivalence with
Morita equivalence.
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Results of this form would take a significant step towards improving upon cate-
gorical equivalence as a general standard of equivalence between theories. And
indeed, work in this direction is currently being done by Hudetz (2016).15
The results here take a step towards providing justification for the use of cat-
egory theoretic tools when examining the relationships between theories. The
tools seems to be particularly well-suited to capture (i) when models of one
theory have less structure than models of another theory, and (ii) when two
theories are equivalent. More generally, these results provide support for one
of the primary motivations behind category theory. The idea at the heart of
category theory is simple: Mathematical objects can be thought of, not in terms
of their “internal structure,” but rather in terms of the relations that they bear
to other objects. For example, from the category theoretic perspective one sees
a group not as a set with a binary operation, but instead as an object in a
particular network of arrows. This viewpoint has proven useful over the course
of the last sixty years, yielding applications in many branches of mathematics
and computer science. The extent to which the perspective is justified, how-
ever, depends on precisely how much information about mathematical objects
is encoded by the arrows — that is, the structure-preserving maps — between
the objects. Theorems 1 and 2 take a step towards justifying this perspective:
The structure-preserving maps between mathematical objects encode all of the
information about which structures are and are not definable on the objects.
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